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Abstract
Scholars have developed a range of qualitative and quantitative models for
generalizing the dynamics of technological innovation and identifying patterns of
competition between rivals. This thesis compares two predominant approaches in
the quantified modeling of technological innovation and competition. Multi-mode
framework, based on the Lotka-Volterra equation barrowed from biological
ecology, provide a rich setting for assessing the interaction between two or more
technologies. A more recent approach uses System Dynamics to model the
dynamics of innovative industries. A System Dynamics approach enables the
development of very comprehensive models, which can cover multiple
dimensions of innovation, and provides very broad insights for innovative and
competitive landscape of an industry.
As well as comparing these theories in detail, a case study is also performed on
both of them. The phenomenal competition between two technologies in the
consumer photography market; the recent battle between digital and film camera
technology, is used as a test case and simulated by both models. Real market data
is used as inputs to the simulations. Outputs are compared and interpreted with
the realities of the current market conditions and predictions of industry analysts.
Conclusions are derived on the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches.
Directions for future research on model extensions incorporating other forms of
innovation are given, such as collaborative interaction in SME networks.
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Title: David J. McGrath jr (1959) Professor of Management and Innovation
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1. Introduction
Technological innovation has been the most powerful thrust behind economic growth and rising
standards in our quality of life. In the last century industrial growth and GDP of many nations has been
rising at an unprecedented pace, especially in industrialized and emerging nations, which were
successful in adopting open-market and free-trade policies and practices. In open markets, firms
compete with their products and services depending on their superiority and attributes such as quality,
performance, flexibility, cost, or timing. Innovation activities, both inside and outside of firms, are
significant determinants of these attributes, and the success or failure of firms [Suarez 2003]. Recently,
examining these activities and modeling the dynamics of innovation, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, has received significant attention by many scholars, and institutional researchers. As
research in this area reveals more about the dynamics and determinants of success or failure in open
markets, the findings will have significant impact on developing better policies, and setting the course
for sustainable growth by regulators of established markets and new adopters, and accumulating a
valuable knowledge base for the guidance and betterment of players in the open market arenas [Dosi
1982].
This thesis' focus is the comparison of two methodologies, Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics, used in
the quantified modeling of technology industry dynamics. It builds on decades of research and the work
of Abernathy, Clark, Pistorius, Utterback and Weil. The framework for multi-mode interaction among
the technologies of Pistorius and Utterback not only identifies different forms of technological battles
between competing technologies, it also provides a numerical solution model based on differential
Lotka-Volterra equations for n-numbers of technologies [Pisterious and Utterback 1997]. Their unique
framework captures the reality that interaction between technologies is not always confrontational. In
fact this interaction can manifest itself reciprocally when one technology may either enhance or inhibit
another technology's growth. In their work three possible modes of interaction exist, pure competition
where both technologies inhibit the other's growth rate, symbiosis where both technologies enhance
the other's growth rate, and predator-prey interaction where one technology enhances the other's
growth rate, but the second inhibits the growth rate of the first. The multi-mode framework with model
formulation for simulation provides one of the richest frameworks for examining the interaction of
technologies. Multiple modes, further account for the transitionary effects as the interaction between
the technologies transgresses from one mode to another, with time.
Recent work of Weil and Utterback captures and analyzes the fundamental dynamics of innovative
industries within a System Dynamics model. System dynamics is an approach used to understand the
behavior of complex systems over time. It deals with internal feedback loops and time delays affecting
the behavior of an entire system. What makes using system dynamics different from other approaches
to study complex systems is the use of feedback loops, stocks and flows. These elements help describe
how even seemingly simple systems display baffling nonlinearity. In their work, Weil and Utterback
selectively reviewed the literature, and identified fundamental dynamics as the sources of innovations
and their impacts on firms, markets, and industries, such as entry exit of firms, experimentation and
innovation, technology evolution, improvements in cost and performance, emergence of standards and
dominant designs, adoption of new technology, network effects, development of a mass market, market
growth, market saturation, intensity of competition and commoditization. They created conceptual
models capturing these dynamics and then converted them into System Dynamics simulation models
representing two competing technologies. The simulation results approximate many actual cases.
In order to provide a common base for comparison, in this thesis we chose two distinct technologies in
the photography market, which have been in competition since early 1990s. Digital and film camera
technologies excluding camera phones are our choice for this particular case. When Kodak's first digital
camera appeared on the market more than a decade ago, it was perceived as more novel than practical
for both professional and amateur photographers. Prices were well above the thousands, image
resolution and quality was poor, and the cameras were bulky and inconvenient to use. Over time as key
performance metrics drastically improved, and many new entrants rushed into emerging market, each
year hundreds of new models flooded the mass market, rapidly melting the dominance of film based
cameras. After a two decades transition period, many industry analysts agree that the technology
transition is over, and the only question remaining is whether film cameras can stay forever in with, may
be one or two niches, or will they only be staged in technology museums.
Outline
In the second chapter we summarize key concepts and models in technological innovation. We reviewed
the literature and major contributions to the field. Focus areas include, technological innovation,
emergence of dominant design, patterns of emergence in disruptive innovations. We overview
predominant examples in technology history, such as the evolution of the printing business, and hard
disk drive industry. Then we highlight marketing frameworks such as technology diffusion and lead user
innovation. We also examine product architecture by relating it to industry structure, and reviewed
essential frameworks, developed by world renowned scholars.
In chapter three, we dive into the details of the Lotka-Volterra model, and its formulation. We drive its
numerical solution and explain in detail its use in the multi-mode framework of technology competition.
Similarly in chapter four we explain the details of the System Dynamics model which is developed for
simulating the dynamics of innovative industries. Although we go through the conceptual models in this
chapter, the details of simulation model are placed in the Appendix for user's review.
In chapter five, we compare the outputs of both models in detail. First the outputs of System Dynamic
model are presented. System dynamics model provides us with a rich portfolio of results in several
attributes of technology competition. For the simulation of the Lotka-Volterra model, we go step by step
through how the numerical solution of the model is implemented in a spreadsheet and its linear
optimization package is used to generate optimal parameters in order to do best curve fitting on the
actual data. Later, the model with optimized parameters is used for predicting future dynamics of
competition between two technologies.
In chapter six, we discuss two models, and the results of camera market case study. We not only
compare the simulation outputs, but also incorporate the findings and research of media, industry
articles, and analysis reports of market research companies in order to reflect on real market conditions,
in each compared dimension.
In the last chapter, we drive conclusions out of this study and suggest future areas of research.
2. Overview of key concepts and models in technological innovation
Innovation and industrial evolution
The model proposed by Abernathy and Utterback captures the dynamics of the rate of major innovation
over time within an industry. This model cuts through two dimensions: 1) the components of product
innovation, process innovation, competitive environment and organizations; and 2) the life cycle of the
industry, itself.
The model characterizes the evolution of an innovative industry in three phases; fluid, transitional, and
specific. These three phases are associated both with rate of innovation and the underlying dimensions
of the product, process, competition, and organization. The dynamic model of the rate of innovation and
the significant characteristics of each phase, as they apply to product, process, competition and
organization, are presented in figure 1.
Fluid Phase
In the fluid phase of a technology's evolution, the rate of innovation is very high and rapid. The
technologies in the market are usually, crude, expensive, and unreliable. Uncertainty defines user needs
and new technologies worked on. Functional product performance is the main basis for competition
among competitors in the industry, which usually has an entrepreneurial character. Importance of
Intellectual Property is very high as propriety technologies are firms' core resource for capturing and
improving market share.
Process innovation takes secondary attention at this stage. Frequent changes in product design, features
and characteristic, uncertainty in technologies and market conditions, relatively small and fragmented
market sizes, high profit margins caused by proprietary technologies do not provide enough motives for
investing in process innovation. Manufacturing requires high flexibility, which can be best attained by a
skilled labor force, conducted in small scale plants, and generally located close to the source of the
technology.
Organizations are usually smaller in size, informal, and entrepreneurial. Competitors are few but
growing in number and size as the market grows. Entry barriers into industry are low and the number of
firms rapidly increases as the market signals prospects of growth and profit.
Product innovation
Process innovation
Fluid phase Transitional Specific phase
phase
Figure 1 The dynamics of innovation1
Utterback, J.M., "Mastering the dynamics of innovation", HBS, p. 91, 1994
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Product From high variety, to dominant design, to incremental
innovation on standardized products
Process Manufacturing progresses from heavy reliance on skilled
labor and general purpose equipment to specialized
equipment tended by low-skilled labor
Organization From entrepreneurial organic firm to hierarchical
mechanistic firm with defined tasks and procedures and
few rewards for radical innovation
Market From fragmented and unstable with diverse products and
rapid feedback to commodity-like with largely
undifferentiated products
Competition From many small firms with unique products to an
oligopoly of firms with similar products
Transitional Phase
As the market grows, acceptance of a dominant design by the market will take place. As market
characteristics and user needs are better understood, products and innovation start to converge into
certain areas, which become more certain.
Concept of dominant design
The term dominant design was first coined by the work of Utterback and Abernathy, to signify
the emergence of a dominant technology in an industry.
A dominant design in a product class is the one that wins the allegiance of the marketplace, the
one that competitors and innovators must adhere to if they hope to gain significant market
share [Utterback 1994]. Usually, the dominant design takes the form of a new product by the
fusion of individually technological innovations introduced interdependently during the fluid
form of an industry.
During the recent history of computing, the emergence and dominance of the IBM PC is a
predominant example of dominant design among all other alternative PC designs manufactured
by competitors such as Apple, Tandy, etc. This landmark event in PC industry happened in 1981
by the introduction of IBM PC with a list price of $3000. Although this product did not offer any
technological breakthroughs, it was equipped with innovative components, such as Intel 8088
microprocessor, floppy disk, CRT monitor, standard QWERTY keyboard, and fused by open
architecture and standards. By betting on an open architecture strategy, IBM leveraged many
suppliers such as Intel and Microsoft, which helped the development of the IBM PC in less than
18 months. It also became the center of gravity for many hardware and software manufacturers
in the industry who wanted to be "IBM compatible" and command a market share in the
industry.
In this phase the product and process innovations are more tightly linked. Designs require more
consideration from manufacturing technologies and the cost efficiency of production. Expensive
equipment brought into manufacturing and islands of automation began to appear the in shop floor.
The growing rigidity in manufacturing and operations mean that design changes slows down and
becomes more costly.
Specific Phase
In specific phase, the objective of the firms remaining in the industry is to produce specific products at a
very high level of efficiency. At this time, basis of competition turns from innovative products and new
features to the value ratio of quality to cost. The link between product and process are very close.
Manufacturing equipment used is highly specialized, automated, expensive, and geared towards highly
efficient, low unit cost production of highly specified products. Therefore the cost of changing designs
and implementing radical innovations in products are extremely high and disruptive to manufacturing
systems of the organizations.
Organizationally, firms are more structured, managed by rigid rules and goals. Inventors are replaced by
managers who monitor and control the smooth working of production systems. Competitors are few,
with stable market shares. Entry barriers into industry are high, caused by saturated markets and high
capital and technology investments of the existing firms.
Dominant design and industry landscape
James Utterback studied the business of printing covering four major innovation cycles in the industry.
Mechanical typewriters, electrical typewriters, word processors, and personal computers have one
fundamental objective: to put words on paper neatly and efficiently. The reader should refer to Prof.
Utterback's Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation for the breathtaking story of this industry and its
evolution over a period of more than a century. Figure 2 presents the ecology of business succession by
graphing the total number of firms in this industry. It must be noted that each time technology shifted,
new dominant firms emerged and their predecessors usually exited the industry if they failed to adopt
the new technology and standards. During 1900 Underwood, Remington, Royal, and L.C. Smith &
Brothers were supposed to dominate the American market. During the electric typewriter era, IBM
controlled 60 percent of the market. During early 1970s, dedicated word processors began to appear
and replace typewriters. New companies emerged such as Wang, Olivetti, Xerox and led the market
along with IBM. In the age of PCs, Apple, Tandy, Commodore emerged as the innovators, until IBM
entered the market and changed the industry structure from vertical to horizontal by its open-
architecture and aggressive outsourcing strategy. During this structural shift in the PC industry, new
players such as Compaq and Dell emerged where the old leaders Tandy and Commodore struggled and
finally exited the industry.
E
L.
E
1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2005
Figure 2 Ecology of business succession2
If chapters in the printing industry are examined in more detail, the common pattern of number of firms
and its relation with dominant design would become clearer. Figure 3 depicts the number of entries,
exits, and total number of firms in U.S. market of typewriter industry over a course of six decades.
Initially the growth was rather slow and the peak level in the industry took almost three decades. In
early 19th century there were over 30 firms in U.S. market and until that time typewriter manufacturers
offered products with few standardized characteristics. Underwood introduced its Model 5 in 1899. This
was the first typewriter allowing the typist to see what he or she actually typed as the keys struck the
page. It was also the first to have a tabulator which makes columnar presentations much simpler, and it
was able to cut stencils and make good copies. These features helped the Model 5 to grasp the
dominant share of the market quickly, and it formed users expectations of what an ideal typewriter
should look like.
2Utterback, J.M., Disruptive Technologies lecture notes, Sloan school of management, MIT, 2006
16
N C
3C
r S5C
c
r IC
s ZL
1C
n
-- ENTFV
--- EXT
- TOTAL
r 
"
PI- Q C C 0' '4 '. 00 - C' P0 C 4'I adI) 4
V•qso (fron 1874 to 1936)
Figure 3 Number of firms in the U.S. typewriter industry
After Underwood's Model 5 became the dominant design, the irreversible decline in the industry started
in 1907. By 1940, only five manufacturers had a share in the market; Remington, Royal, Smith and
Underwood, each having 20% market share and IBM with 10% share. After its peak time, more than 90%
of the firms entered the industry either bankrupted or exited the industry [Utterback 1994].
Many scholars studied a variety of industries; automobiles, televisions, transistors, integrated circuits,
etc. The pattern presented in figure 3, can be similarly recognized in all of these industries, although not
always as close to a bell shape curve as in typewriter industry.
Patterns in the emergence of disruptive innovations
S-curve
The recurring phenomenon in every industry is the dynamics between an established product and an
invading product having a radical technological innovation. This generalized pattern, also known as an S-
3Utterback, J.M., "Mastering the dynamics of innovation", HBS, p.33, 1994
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curve model, can be seen in many product markets as periods of continuity, when the rate of innovation
is incremental and infrequent, and periods of discontinuity when product or process changes occur.
Radical innovation creates new businesses and destroys existing ones, just as ice maker machines
destroyed the New England ice-harvesting industry, personal computers killed mini computers, and
digital cameras conquered almost all of the photography market analog cameras once had [Utterback
1994].
An invading technology has the potential for delivering radically better product performance or lower
production costs, or both. In the fluid phase of an industry, the performance of a particular product
improves rapidly as many different design approaches are tried. After a dominant design emerges and
major advances have been made, a period of incremental innovation and infrequent change sets in. At
this stage, when invading technology appears, the established technology offers~better performance or
cost than its challenger. However if invading technology has real merit, it typically enters a period of
rapid development, as mature technology enters a stage of slow improvements with descending speed
(Figure 4).
Invading
product
Time
Figure 4 Performance dynamics of an established and an invading product4
Utterback, J.M., "Mastering the dynamics of innovation", HBS,p.159, 1994
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In such scenarios, the established players do not always sit back and relax. Most of them fight back. The
burst of improvement from the established player in figure 5, symbolizes this behavior. The established
player briefly enjoys this burst of improvement, however eventually performance of invading products
surpass the established product, which has the improvement becoming marginal over time.
Invmdinn
Product
ablished
duct
Time
Figure 5 Burst of improvement in challenged products
Manager's dilemma: to listen or not to listen to the customer?
Among many patterns identified by scholars in technology industries, Clayton Christensen's framework
on Disruptive Technologies is one of the most stunning. Christensen investigates why many successful
companies in their industries fail suddenly, and defeated by a small and entrepreneurial, new entrant to
the industry, which they ignored.
Many established and well managed companies try to solve rationale questions in order to stay
competitive and increase their market performance. When they are working on a new technology
product, they ask whether their mainstream customers will want it? Is the market big enough that, their
investments for the technology are justifiable? In answering all these questions, they unknowingly find
5 Utterback, J.M., "Mastering the dynamics of innovation", HBS, p.160, 1994
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themselves in the heart of a management paradox. For many established companies staying close only
listening to mainstream customers and being ignorant to emerging markets were lethal.
Research proves that most well managed companies consistently deliver new technologies and
products, as long as those technologies address the next generation performance needs of their
mainstream customers. However, these very same companies rarely show interest in technology
appealing to only a small or emerging market, having no affiliation with their mainstream customers.
Christensen identified this pattern repeatedly in many industries that confronted technological change.
In each instance, the companies listened to their prime customers, delivered them the products they
needed, and in the end disrupted by those technologies their customers led them to ignore.
The history of the hard disk drive industry reflects this disruptive pattern multiple times. The managers
of established hard disk companies stumbled at each instance of technology change, when the diameter
of disk drives shrank from 14 inches to 8 inches to 5.25 inches then to 3.5 inches and finally to 1.8
inches. Each new architecture, which essentially had dimensional and weight merit, initially offered the
market substantially less storage capacity than its predecessor. As an example, the first 8 inch drives
offered 20 MB when it was first introduced, while 14 inch drives were offering about 200 MB at the
time. The leading mainframe manufacturers rejected 8 inch architecture at first. As a result hard disk
manufacturers shelved their projects for developing 8 inch architectures and focused all their best
resources to improve the capacity of 14 inch drives. The pattern was repeated with 5.25, 3.5, and 1.8
inch disk drives; established computer manufacturers rejected the new drives as their capacity was
inadequate for their customers and so did disk-drive suppliers.
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Figure 6 Capacity demanded vs. capacity supplied in Hard Disks6
To explain the reasons behind these events, the concept of performance trajectories, the rate which the
performance of a product has improved, and is expected to improve, can be used. It is possible to
identify a critical performance metric in almost every industry. In digital photography, it is the resolution
of pictures (measured in Mega Pixels), in microprocessor industry it is speed of execution of
mathematical operations (nowadays measured in Giga Hertz range), or in the hard disk industry it is the
storage capacity (which reached Giga Byte levels early 90s). Figure 6 portrays the performance
trajectories of each disk drive architecture, from 14 inch to 2.5 inch over approximately two decades.
Two observations can be made from this figure. First, sustaining technologies tend to maintain a rate of
improvement and give customers better performance in the attributes they already have. For instance,
thin-film components in drives, which replaced conventional ferrite heads and oxide disks between 1982
and 1990, enabled capacity increase. Second, disruptive technologies introduce a very different package
of attributes from the one mainstream customers have and they usually perform a lot worse in the
attributes that mainstream customer value. When the first 8 inch drive was introduced its capacity was
6 Bower, J.L, Christensen, C.M., "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave", Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, p. 46, 1995
less than the average capacity of 14 inch disks by 1/50. However in physical dimensions and weight, it
was considerably smaller than 14 inch. Unfortunately, these were attributes mainframe users did not
value much, and nor did manufacturers. Indeed, while offering less capacity, the disruptive architectures
created other new attributes as well as smaller sizes; internal power suppliers(8 inch drives), low cost
stepper motors(5.25 inch drives), ruggedness, light weight, and low power consumption (3.5 inch
drives). The disruptive architectures in disk drives made possible the emergence of new markets which
created minicomputers, desk top PCs, and portable computers, respectively [Christensen 2002].
How to identify a disruptive technology?
The pattern of disruptive technologies can be generalized as in figure 7. Proven in many cases, it is
noticeable that once the disruptive technology became established in their new markets, sustaining
innovations raises its performance so steep that, it soon reaches the performance trajectory the market
needs. At this point, the defended technology might have a performance well above what the
marketplace can absorb. This state actually makes the defended technology vulnerable in marketplace
[Bower and Christensen 1995].
Further, Christensen suggests a method to spot and cultivate disruptive technologies. The first step in
identifying a disruptive technology is to examine internal disagreements over the development of new
products and technologies. Usually financial and marketing managers rarely support a disruptive
technology because they will have a very tiny managerial or financial incentive. On the other hand,
technical groups often persist in the disruptive technology and the market it will create. The next step is
to ask the right questions to the right people. Managers generally ask questions and assess a new
technology for their mainstream customers and hoping to get good feedback. Generally these
customers will be pushing the product performance higher to stay ahead of the game and they will be
accurate when they are assessing the potential of a sustaining technology. However they will be the
wrong people to ask when assessing the potential of a disruptive technology.
(L
I-
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Time
Figure 7 Pattern of the disruptive technology7
Once managers have determined a technology is disruptive, the next step is to locate the initial markets
for that technology. Usually traditional market research techniques fail, as there may not even be a
concrete market, for the disruptive technology. Under this condition, managers should create
information about emerging markets, such as, who could be potential customers, and what are the
segments, use context, valuable features, and price points. The best way to create this type of
information is to experiment with rapid new releases of a product line. It is easier for small and
entrepreneurial companies to experiment like this, but for established companies which are strict with
processes and managerial hierarchy, it is very difficult. Often, the best choice for them is to keep an eye
on small and agile companies and acquire the technology when it becomes sufficiently proven and the
market shows sign of expansion. If an established company decides to develop a disruptive technology
organically, creating a separate organization is necessary; with the conditions that disruptive technology
has a lower profit margin than the mainstream business, and should serve the unique needs of a new
set of customers.
A manager can spot and either incubate or acquire a disruptive technology, by utilizing the techniques
briefly described above, but one should differentiate between recognizing the pattern and breaking the
pattern, they are very different. Generally, disruptive technologies are financially very unattractive to
established companies. The potential revenues from the emerging markets are very small, or even
nonexistent. Hence, managers typically find themselves in a dilemma when making a decision. One
7Utterback, J.M., Disruptive Technologies lecture notes, Sloan school of management, MIT, 2006
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option is going down market with the disruptive technology, accepting the smaller markets and lower
profit margins. The other is to go up market with sustaining technologies and enter market segments,
which has attractive and large market sizes and lucrative profit margins. In most well managed
companies, latter choice is the rational path to take in order to reduce risk and advance careers.
Technology adoption, lead user innovation and communities
Diffusion of Innovations
Before moving into lead user innovation, it is necessary to briefly examine the technology adoption
lifecycle model first proposed by Everett Rogers, in his famous book Diffusion of Innovations.
Early Majority
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Figure 8 Rogers' technology adoption lifecycle model s
The technology adoption lifecycle depicted in figure 8, models adoption of a new innovation or product,
according to the demographic and psychological characteristics of defined adopter groups. The process
of adoption is illustrated with a bell curve, segmenting adopters in five categories: starting with
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and finally laggards. Rogers' model characterizes
these five segments as follows [Rogers 1995]:
1. Innovators - They are venturesome, and educated. These people are eager to take risks for big
returns.
8 Roger, E., "Diffusion of Innovations", Free Press, 1995
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2. Early adopters- They are social leaders, popular, and educated. They like to try new ideas but
are not techies like innovators.
3. Early majority - They are deliberate and thoughtful people, accepting change more quickly than
average. They usually have many informal social contacts.
4. Late majority - They are skeptical, traditional, and a lower socio-economic status. They will use
new ideas or products only if the early majority is using it.
5. Laggards -They are traditional, and conservative. They will accept new ideas only when it
becomes mainstream or traditional. Neighbors and friends are their main info sources and they
are very risk averse.
Further, Geoffrey Moore builds on Rogers' model in his famous 1999 book, "Crossing the Chasm". He
argues there is a chasm between the early adopters of the product (the technology enthusiasts and
visionaries) and the early majority (the pragmatists). Moore believes visionaries and pragmatists have
very different expectations. He attempts to explore those differences and suggest techniques to
successfully cross the "chasm," including choosing a target market, understanding the whole product
concept, positioning the product, building a marketing strategy, and choosing the most appropriate
distribution channel and pricing [Moore 1999].
Lead user innovation
Almost all models about technological innovation and evolution have a common fundamental
assumption that innovation is developed by manufacturers and delivered to users in order to perform
one or more functions. On the contrary, the lead user theory assumes that innovation not necessarily
always happens by a manufacturer in a manufacturing setting. Instead, the theory suggests most
commercially attractive products and product modifications are developed by users with lead user
characteristics. Eric Von Hippel, world renowned scholar on lead user innovation, claims lead users have
two distinguishing characteristics: 1) They are at the leading edge of an important market trend, and
experiencing needs that will be experienced by many users in that market, 2) They anticipate high
benefits from obtaining a solution to their needs, so they innovate [von Hippel 2005]. As depicted in
figure 9, lead users are actually the innovators constituting the first segment of Rogers' innovation
adaption curve. However a significant change in the view is that the first segment of lead users innovate
to satisfy their own needs, not to adopt an innovation from a manufacturer.
Several scholars studied a variety of industries to find empirical proof, that innovation is done by users
and often commercial products are derived from this innovation. Franke and Shah studied user
innovation in sports. They studied four communities of sports, canyoning( a popular sports in the Alps),
gliding, boardercross (six snowboarders competing in a downhill race), and handicapped cyclists that
need improvements in their equipment to accommodate their disabilities. Their research revealed that
users' innovations varied a great deal. In the sailplane community, users developed innovations such as
a rocket-assisted emergency ejection system. Snowboarders improved their boots and bindings.
Canyoners' invented ways to cut loose a trapped rope by using a chemical etchant. They also found that
23% of the innovations were soon produced for sale by a manufacturer [Franke and Shah 2003].
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Figure 9 Lead user innovation9
The advent of the World Wide-Web and the consequent proliferation of open-source software projects
around the world has became a focal point for many researchers from academia on the phenomenon of
user innovation communities. A predominant example is the Apache open-source web server. The
server software was first developed by Rob McCool, while he was working at the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). As he posted his source on the web, a small group of webmasters
decided to continue using and developing it. After extensive feedback from many users and
modifications, Apache 1.0 was released on Dec. 1, 1995. Four years later, with improvements by many
users, Apache became most popular Web server on the internet despite strong competition from
Microsoft and Netscape [Von Hippel 2001].
Von Hippel, E., "Democratizing innovation", MIT press, p.134, 2005
,,,.,,,
Product architecture and platforms
Defining architectural innovation
The types of innovation discussed so far can be grouped into two categories. Radical innovation
establishes a new dominant design with a new set of design concepts and creates a new set of core
design concepts. Incremental innovation refines and improves the performance of an established
product. In incremental innovation improvement often only occurs in individual components, but the
underlying design concepts and links between them stays the same. Architectural innovation, a third
type occurs when a product's architecture changes but the components and the core design concepts
are left unchanged.
The framework of Abernathy and Clark classifying innovation types is given in figure 10. This framework
consists of four quadrants representing innovations: Architectural, Niche, Incremental, and
Revolutionary. In addition to the three types mentioned, the niche quadrant represents innovation
called by Utterback as "sales maximization", in which a stable and specified product is refined and
improved so that it will support a new marketing thrust. In figure 10, the market transilience scale is in
the vertical dimension, and technology transilience scale in the horizontal. (The term "transilience of
innovation" was coined by Abernathy and Clark to indicate the significance of innovation to influence a
firm's existing resources, skills, and knowledge) [Abernathy and Clark 1985].
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Figure 10 Abernathy and Clark' s framework for innovation types10
10 Adopted from, Abernathy, W.J., Clark, K.B., "Innovation: mapping the winds of creative destruction", Research Policy, 14, 3-22, 1985
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Revolutionary innovation is at the heart of Schumpeter's theory of innovation and economic
development in which "creative destruction" is the vehicle for growth. These types of innovation, which
creates new industries and is often propelled by scientific research, have been extensively reviewed in
literature. However, as products become more and more complex with blurred boundaries between
software, hardware and services, architectural innovation gains in importance. That is what we shall
review here and discuss how it is used as a competitive weapon for superior transilience in markets by
established companies.
The essence of architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an established system to link together
existing components in a new way. This does not mean that component technology never changes.
Architectural innovation is often triggered by a change in a component, creating new linkages and
interactions with other components in the established product. Here is an illustrative example given by
Henderson and Clark from the HVAC (Heating Ventilating Air Conditioning) industry: If a room's ceiling
air fan is an established technology, improvements in its blade design, or the motor would be
incremental innovations. A central air conditioning unit would be a radical innovation, with a completely
different set of technology and design. However introduction of a portable fan for the large ceiling fan
manufacturers would be an architectural innovation. While the components of the products will be
pretty much the same, the architecture of the product would be different [Henderson and Clark 1990].
Product architecture and industry cycles
Every product has architecture. Product architecture is classified in two categories: Integral or modular.
In his book Clockspeed, Charles Fine explains product architecture types and their relationship with
industry dynamics using the recent history of the computer industry.
In the 1970s and early 1980s the computer industry structure was vertical. The three largest companies,
IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation and Hewlett-Packard were highly integrated as well as other small
players referred to as "BUNCH". In this early stage of the computer industry, products and systems
exhibited integral architectures. Almost all of the components of a computer, microprocessors,
operating, systems, and peripherals etc. were manufactured in house by the firms in the market. There
were no industry standards or interfaces available; hence there was little or no interchangeability across
different companies' systems.
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Figure 11 Vertical Industry Structure and Integral Product Architecture in the Computer Industry"
During these years, IBM gained significant market power by keeping its integral product architecture
close, and holding their existing customers hostage. In the late 1970s, IBM faced fierce competition from
Apple with a smaller product called a Personal Computer. In response IBM launched a new business
division and a new personal computer of its own.
However for its new PC, IBM chose different product architecture, -modular architecture-, outsourcing
almost all major components, such as the microprocessor to Intel and, operating system to Microsoft.
The dominant design became an IBM-compatible computer. Many companies entered the industry as
subsystem supplies; semiconductors, application software, peripherals, networks, and PC design and
assembly. IBM strategy created a shift from a vertical/integral (Figure 11) industry structure to a
horizontal/modular one (Figure 12). Within this horizontal structure new companies emerged and
competition became very fierce in each supply segment [Fine and Whitney 1996].
11Fine, C. H., "ClockSpeed: Winning Industry Control in the age of Temporary Advantage", Perseus Books, p.44, 1998
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Figure 12 Horizontal Industry Structure and Modular Product Architecture in the Computer Industry12
The fierce competition fueled healthy growth in the industry. The IBM-compatible PCs subsystems
drastically improved performance curves and delivered product systems which were far more superior
to Apple's Macintosh computer. Quite surprisingly, IBM lost about $1 billion in market value after its
strategic move, since it was squeezed by assembler like; Compaq, Gateway, Hewlett-Packard, Dell, and
many other domestic and international PC assemblers. With a vast amount of supplier options,
continuous price-decrease in almost every supplier segment, and an industry wide accepted standard;
IBM-compatible entry barriers into PC design and assembly business was almost non-existent.
Fine's Double-Helix model generalizes the behavior of this industry shift from vertical/integral to
modular/horizontal. He suggests that the cycle is reciprocal. Horizontal structures are as unstable as
vertical structures. Horizontal structures tend to create fierce, commodity competition across layers.
When a player in a segment gains power and an edge in costs, quality, and technology, for example, it
will drive out weaker competitors. Once a firm finds market power in its row, it will seek opportunities
to extend vertically as well. Both Microsoft and Intel, the most powerful players of their respective
segments, exhibited this behavior. Microsoft, dominating Operating Systems, entered into application
software, network software, multimedia content, and peripheral hardware segments. Intel expanded
from microprocessors to the design and assembly of motherboards and, graphics processors. Figure 13
Fine, C. H., "ClockSpeed: Winning Industry Control in the age of Temporary Advantage", Perseus Books, p.46, 1998
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illustrates the dynamic cycle modeled as a double helix. When the industry structure is vertical and
product architecture is integral, the forces pushing towards a horizontal industry structure and modular
product architecture include [Fine 1998]:
1. The entry of niche competitors to pick off discrete industry segments.
2. The challenge of keeping ahead of the competition across many dimensions of technology and
products.
3. The organizational rigidities that often constraint established companies for innovation in
particular technologies.
Figure 13 The Double Helix Model 13
On the other hand, when an industry has a horizontal structure, another set of forces push towards
more vertical integration in industry and integral architecture in products. These forces include:
1. Technical advances in one subsystem make the commodity scarce in the chain and the powerful
and greedy owner will seek entry into adjacent segments to pick up market share.
2. Market power in one subsystem encourages bundling with other subsystems to increase control
and add more value.
13 Fine, C. H., "ClockSpeed: Winning Industry Control in the age of Temporary Advantage", Perseus Books, p. 49, 1998
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3. Market power in one subsystem encourages engineering integration with other subsystems to
develop profitable integral solutions, delivering higher performance in specific attributes.
Product platforms
While architectural innovation is a challenge to companies with rigid organizational structures, many
companies were able to use strategies based on product architecture to create business value, conquer
new markets, and reach new levels at cost-effectiveness.
A product platform is a set of subsystems and interfaces forming a common structure from which a
stream of derivative products can be efficiently developed and produced. A single product's architecture
is considered a product platform architecture when it is designed and used as a foundation for the
architecture of several other derivative products. When many products share the same product
architecture, they are called a product family [Meyer and Utterback 1993]. A general framework for
effective use of product families as proposed by Meyer and Utterback is presented in figure 14. This
figure represents a single product family (Product family A) starting with initial development of a
product platform. Using this platform successive families are followed by major advancements to the
core product and process technology of that platform, with derivative products in each generation.
Platform family B represents a new generation of products intended to extend the core capabilities of
the company to a new market using the very same platform.
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Figure 14 The product family approach to new product development"
A product family typically addresses a market segment, while particular products address market niches
within that segment. The commonality of technologies and architecture used across multiple product
families leads to efficiency and effectiveness in design, manufacturing, distribution, and service, as the
firm tailors its core competencies to the specific needs of customer clusters. Black & Decker was one of
the pioneers of platform strategy in the U.S. in the early 1970s. The company had dozens of products, jig
saws, drills, and sanders using thirty different motors, sixty different motor housings, and dozens of
different operation controls. Black & Decker, in order to remain competitive decreased its costs one
third by adopting common product platforms across in entire product families. With a budget of $20
million allocated to this effort, engineers designed standard motor housings, controls, and adhesive-
bonded armature which can be used in multiple families. Product costs dramatically reduced by 50
percent, and shares soared from 20 percent to dominant pie in most of the product markets that Black
and Decker competes in [Meyer and Lehnerd 1997].
14 Meyer M., H., Utterback, J.M., "The product family and the dynamics of core capability", Sloan Management Review, p.32, Spring 1993
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Further, Meyer and Lehnerd identified four different strategies for using Product Platforms. These
strategies are depicted in figure 15 on market segmentation grids. In a market segmentation grid,
horizontal segments denote cost/performance tiers, "low cost, mid range, high cost", or "low
performance, mid range, high performance". Vertical segments denote different business segments that
where the company is active.
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Figure 15 Platform Strategies' s
Many other well know established companies used platform strategy. For Sony, there has been no
greater success than the Walkman. Sony dominated the market, worth $1 billion worldwide, for over a
decade and stayed market leader despite fierce competition from world class consumer electronics
manufacturers. According to Sanderson and Uzumeri's research, Sony's Walkman strategy was an
example of outstanding product family management. Sony followed a disciplined and creative approach
to focus its sub-families on clear design goals and target models to distinct market segments.
15Utterback, J.M., Disruptive Technologies lecture notes, Sloan school of management, MIT, 2006
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Figure 16 Generational walkman innovations at Sony16
Sony offered 20 new models each year and during the 1980s almost 250 models into the US market.
From 1980 to 1988, the average market life of a Sony model was 1.97 years. This is twice as long as its
competitors. Figure 16 depicts major platforms and two major component technologies developed in
Walkman by Sony. Superflat motors enabled dramatic size and weight reduction in Walkman, further
augmented by chewing gum batteries, taking advantage of low power consumption of the superflat
motors and redesigned electro-mechanics. With platforms as a basis, most of these models were
achieved by making small changes in features, packaging and appearance. Sanderson and Uzumeri
categorized these non-platform changes into two further categories: incremental and topological
innovations. To support the level of variety generated by systematic platform approach and incremental
and topological innovations, Sony invested in flexible manufacturing extensively so that it could make
many Walkman models on small production runs. By combining industrial design with flexible
manufacturing Sony generated designs that had dramatic market impacts and little marginal cost
[Sanderson and Uzumeri 1995].
16 Sanderson S., Uzumeri, M., "Managing product families: The case of Sony walkman", Research Policy, 24, p.768, 1995
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For companies like Intel and Microsoft, platform leadership is a very different ball game. These platform
leaders drive industry wide innovation for evolving systems (such as PCs), which has pieces separately
developed in an industry. As much as these two companies are dependent on each other for innovation
and future development of their products, they are also dependent on many complementor companies
in their industry. Intel considers this situation a challenge, since it cannot be certain that its own key
complementors will continue to produce market-expanding innovations as fast as Intel does. Nor can it
be sure its target platform, the personal computer, will evolve in compatible ways. For example the
platform around the engine may limit the engine, they need to make sure the platform keeps pace on
improving, so that the microprocessor can deliver its potential [Cusumano and Gawer 2002].
3. Lotka-Volterra model and dynamics of competition
Multi-mode interaction among technologies
The concept of multi-mode interaction among two or more technologies was first proposed by Pistorous
and Utterback. Multi-mode framework suggests three modes of interaction among competing
technologies, all are based on the reciprocal enhancement or inhibition of a technologies' growth rate.
The concept was introduced by considering four uni-directional modes of interaction; an emerging
technology which can have a positive or negative influence on the growth of a mature technology, and a
mature technology which can have a positive or negative influence on the growth of an emerging
technology.
These four uni-directional modes are combined to yield the three major modes in the multi-mode
framework [Pistorious and Utterback 1997]:
* Pure competition: An emerging technology has a negative influence on the growth of a mature
technology, and the mature technology has a negative influence on the growth of the emerging
technology.
* Symbiosis: An emerging technology has a positive influence on the growth of a mature
technology, and the mature technology has a positive influence on the growth of the emerging
technology.
* Predator-prey: An emerging technology has a positive influence on the growth of a mature
technology, and the mature technology has a negative influence on the growth of the emerging
technology, or an emerging technology has a negative influence on the growth of a mature
technology, and the mature technology has a positive influence on the growth of the emerging
technology.
Table iMulti mode framework for assessing the interaction among technologies17
Multi mode framework for interaction of Effect of A on B's growth rate
technology A and B Positive Negative
Effect of B on A's Positive Symbiosis Predator(A) - Prey (B)
growth rate Negative Predator(B) - Prey (A) Pure Competition
Pistorius, C.W.I., Utterback, J.M., "Multi-mode interaction among technologies", Research Policy, 26, p.75, 1997
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In order to mathematically model the multi-mode framework described above, a system of coupled
differential equations with coupling coefficients is required to account for the interaction between
them. Lotka-Volterra equations, also known as predator-prey equations, are a pair of first order non-
linear, differential equations proposed to describe the dynamics of biological systems in which two
species interact, one of them, predator and the other, prey. It was proposed by the American
biophysicist Alfred Lotka, and the Italian mathematician Vito Volterra in 1925.
The system of equations describing the interaction can be expressed as [Carroll 1981]:
dN
-
= aN - b N 2 + cnmNM18 Eqn 1
and
M = amM - bmM 2 + CmnMN 18  Eqn 2
In these equations M and N represent two different technologies competing with each other. The signs
of the coefficients indicate the mode of competition. Two positive signs of the coefficients indicate a
symbiotic interaction, two negative signs indicate pure competition, and one positive and one negative
sign indicates predator-prey interaction.
Solution of Lotka Volterra equations
Several authors in literature stated Lotka-Volterra equations cannot be solved explicitly, but they can be
solved numerically. Pielou suggested a numerical solution for the equations in the case of pure
competition [Pielou 1969].
dT = aTi + sciT iTi 19 Eqn3dt j =1
18 Pistorius, C.W.I., Utterback, J.M., "Multi-mode interaction among technologies", Research Policy, 26, 82, 1997
19 Pistorius, C.W.I., Utterback, J.M., "A Lotka-Volterra Model for Multi-mode technological interaction: Modeling Competition, Symbiosis and
Predator Prey Modes", Proceedings of the Fifth international Conference on Management of technology, Miami, FL, Feb 27 - March 1, 1996
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The equation state above, represents J technologies interacting in the same market niche. Each
technology is expressed as Ti(t), where (2 • i < ]). All coefficients are positive and siici = -b i .
Further, if technology j has a positive influence on technology i's growth, sii = +1, whereas if
technologyj has a negative influence on technology i's growth, sqj = -1.
The numeric form solution for Ti(t) can be found by extending Pielou's solution to the general case:
eaiTi(t)
Ti(t + 1) = 20 Eqn4Sijcij(eai _ 1)1 - j= 1  c a t  (t)
The formulation above is a general solution for multi-technology, multi-mode interaction. It can be
easily implemented into a spread sheet or numerically programmed to model the interaction of any
finite number of technologies where the interaction among any pair is either pure competition,
predator-prey, or symbiosis.
Pure competition
Pure competition, where each technology exerts a negative influence on the other's growth is a very
prevalent case in innovation. Farell, used a model based on Lotka-Volterra equations to investigate pure
competition between various technologies, such as lead-free versus soldered food cans, woven versus
tufted carpets, fountain versus ball-point pens, and telephone versus telegraph [Farell 1993]. Pure
competition is often embodied in substitutes, which is one of the five forces model developed by Porter
[Porter 1998]. Substitutes address the same market niche as existing products, they will generally have
an inhibiting effect on the existing products growth in the same niche. For example the emergence of
LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) monitors as an essential part of laptop computers, as their prices went
down, they slowly captured the market of CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) based monitors, acting as a
substitute, with better performance in several attributes such as view quality and product dimensions.
Symbiosis
Symbiosis is when each technology has a positive reciprocal effect on one another's growth rate.
Symbiosis is the association of two different organisms living attached to each other or one within the
other to their mutual advantage. For example, the railroads and the steelmaking industry spurred on
each other's development, as did the electric lighting and the telephone. More recent examples of
symbiosis can be seen in the computer industry [Girifalco 1991]. Symbiosis between major technologies
20 Pistorius, C.W.I., Utterback, J.M., "A Lotka-Volterra Model for Multi-mode technological interaction: Modeling Competition, Symbiosis and
Predator Prey Modes", Proceedings of the Fifth international Conference on Management of technology, Miami, FL, Feb 27 - March 1, 1996
39
of PC components, such as operating systems, CPUs, hard disks, and network components enforce each
other's growth. The strategic alliance between Microsoft and Intel, which is more closely coupled and
co-dependent, is a predominant example from the computer industry.
Predator-prey interaction
A predator-prey relationship may exist between an emerging technology and a mature technology when
the emerging technology enters a niche market that is not served by the mature technology. In such a
case, the emerging technology will benefit from the presence of the mature technology and the mature
technology will exert a positive influence on the emerging technology's growth rate. However, the
emerging technology may slowly steal market share from the mature technology, thus having a negative
influence on the growth of the mature technology. Hence the predator-prey interaction occurs between
them, with the emerging technology, the predator and the mature technology, the prey.
On the other hand, a new technology may trigger a sailing ship effect in the mature technology,
resulting in de-maturing and new growth, having a positive influence on the mature technology's growth
rate. When this effect occurs simultaneously with one where the mature technology has a negative
effect on the growth rate of an emerging technology, a predator-prey relationship results where the
mature technology is the predator and emerging technology is the prey.
A well known example of predator-prey competition is the attack of radial-ply tires on bias-ply tires in
the USA. During 1970s, when bias-ply was dominating US market, French based Michelin invented
radial-ply tire. During its adoption period, sports car drivers who needed high performance started
replacing their tires with radial-ply tires. It is argued that initially the competition mode was predator-
prey in the sense that radial-ply tires took advantage of existence of bias-ply tires. If automobiles were
not using tires at all, a market would not exist and it would be very hard for radial-ply tires to create
one. Until a large deal from Lincoln Continentals, radial-ply tires did not threaten the market of bias-ply
tires since automotive manufacturers were reluctant to modify the suspension design for radial-ply tires
[Foster 1986].
4. System dynamics and innovation modeling
Introduction to modeling with System Dynamics
System dynamics is an approach to understanding the behavior of complex systems over time. It deals
with internal feedback loops and time delays affecting the behavior of the entire system. What makes
using system dynamics different from other approaches to studying complex systems is the use of
feedback loops and stocks and flows. These elements help describe how even seemingly simple systems
display baffling nonlinearity. System dynamics was founded in the late 1950s by Jay W. Forrester of the
MIT Sloan School of Management with the establishment of MIT system dynamics group. He began
applying what he had learned about systems during his work in electrical engineering to everyday kind
of system [Sterman 2000].
System dynamics has been applied to issues ranging from corporate strategy to the dynamics of
diabetes, from the cold war arms race between the US and USSR, to the combat between HIV and
immune system. System dynamics can be applied to any dynamic system with any time and spatial scale.
What system dynamics attempts to do is understand the basic structures of complex socio-technical
systems and thus understand the behavior they will produce. Many of these systems analyzed can be
built as models on a computer by use of specialized software such as Vensim. As computing power gets
better and cheaper, the power of system dynamics is unleashed, as more complicated systems can be
modeled and simulated much easier and faster.
The basic elements of system dynamics diagrams are feedbacks, the accumulation of flows into stocks
and time delays. By any combination of these elements, a loop which can have a balancing effect or re-
enforcing effect on a key variable can be created. A system dynamics model of new product adoption is
depicted in figure 17 comprised of two stocks: potential adopters and adopters. The flow from potential
adopters to adopters is characterized by the effects of two loops: saturation loop (Balancing) and word
of mouth loop (reinforcing). Each link in a diagram has a positive sign if it affects positively from its
originator variable to end variable, or has a negative sign if it affects negatively from its originator
variable to end variable. In addition to the signs on each link, a complete loop also is given a sign. The
sign for a particular loop is determined by counting the number of negative signs on all the links that
comprise a loop. A feedback loop is called positive or reinforcing loop, if it contains an even number of
negative casual links. On the other hand a feedback loop is called negative or balancing loop, if it
contains an odd number of negative casual links.
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Figure 17 System dynamics model of new product adoption21
The real power of system dynamics is unleashed through simulation. The simulation results of the new
product adoption model are given in figure 18. Simulation results prove that the adoption curve follows
a classical s-curve shape. The increase in adopters is very slow in the beginning, then exponential growth
for a period, and finally ends with saturation. As stock of an adopter rises following an S-curve, potential
adopters stock reduces following a reverse s-curve trajectory.
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Figure 18 Simulation results of new production adoption model21
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Dynamics of Innovation
The literature highlights dynamics that are fundamental to sources of innovation and their impact on
firms, markets, and industries. These dynamics are identified by Weil and Utterback as:
* Entry and exit of firms
* Experimentation and innovation
* Technology evolution
* Improvement in cost and performance
* Emergence of standards and dominant designs
* Adoption of new technology
* Network effects
* Development, growth, saturation of a mass market
* Intensity of competition and commoditization
Weil and Utterback captured the fundamental dynamics of innovation in technology industries within a
System Dynamics model. This integrated conceptual model is depicted in figure 19. The model connects
the number of companies in the market, technology evolution, adoption of new technology, and the
profitability of companies. Other fundamental dynamics of innovation are represented; entry and exit of
firms, improvements in cost and performance, market growth, intensity of competition, and
commoditization [Weil and Utterback 2005].
A more detailed casual loop diagram for modeling a number of companies is given in figure 20. In the
fluid phase of an industry usually a "lemming effect" occurs, where there is an inflow of entrants to the
industry by companies which are attracted by the potential of the new industry. In a short amount of
time there will be high number of firms, generating a high level of experimentation and innovation.
Continuous innovation, feature, and performance characterize competition among products. As
diversity of designs and products increase, the need for more standardization grows and dominant
design emerges. After the emergence of a dominant design, innovation based competition gives way to
process based competition which aims to reduce cost and improve quality. As industry stabilizes entry
rate slows and many companies exit, bankrupt or acquired. Remaining companies who own dominant
designs continue to grow and dominate the industry.
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Figure 19 Integrated conceptual model for dynamics of innovation22
The dynamics of technology adoption encompass both objective and emotional factors, i.e.,
price/performance, network effects, and perceived risks (Figure 21). By the emergence of a dominant
design, the industry consolidates, leading to a few companies which can realize substantial economies of
scale. During this transition, incremental improvements continue to enhance performance while process
innovations improve productivity and quality. The decline in unit costs and improvement in quality as a
function of cumulative unit production is called "learning effect".
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Figure 20 Number of firms in the market 22
22 Well, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
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When an industry is new and uncertain, perceived risks of a new technology are high, as they are
unproven. As the number of users increase, skepticism among users turns into confidence in the
technology. Highly respected "reference users" and increasing user masses, make the new technology
legitimate and easier to justify. As the new technology becomes more fashionable as a product or
service, the risk of not adopting is perceived as "becoming a dinosaur" or "not getting it".
The conceptual model based on causal loop diagrams is simple and generic. It can be applied to a broad
range of products and services; assembled or process-based, complex and simple, analog or digital,
business or consumer. In many variations and combinations, most industries can be modeled and
dynamics can be simulated using key parameters about the industry.
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5. Comparison of L&V model and SD in modeling innovation dynamics
using a Case Study
Both of the models, reviewed in the previous chapters in detail, can be applied to a broad range of
industries; assembled and process-based, complex or simple, physical or digital, business or consumer.
However in order to show a good contrast between two simulation methods, choosing an industry
where competition between "old" and "new" technology is intense, is important. During the last decade
in the photography market, strong competition has been taking place between the "old" and "new"
technologies.
Our main objective is to compare the characteristics and performance of Lotka-Volterra modeling vs.
System Dynamics approach in innovation dynamics. It is important to review which characteristics of
innovation dynamics can be simulated by two models and those that can be simulated by both of them.
First we will simulate the essential variables incorporated in a System Dynamics model. These are a lot
more than the Lotka-Volterra model can offer. Then we will simulate Lotka- Volterra model and contrast
the results.
Simulation by System Dynamics model
The simulation of competition dynamics by film and digital cameras is limited to the U.S. market only
and we excluded digital cameras in cell phones. It presents results for products based on two
generations of technology, labeled as "old" and 'new". Simulations run from 1990 to 2020. The new
technology was launched in 1990. Market upper limit is bounded by the assumption that 90% household
in U.S. would have cameras [Weil and Utterback 2005].
The first simulation is the number of companies entering and exiting both markets separately, and the
total number. The entry and exit of firms into a market are central to the dynamics of innovation. In the
early stage of a new market or generation of a new technology the perceived opportunity by established
firms and entrepreneurs is large. As technology matures a dominant design emerges and first entry rate
peaks and drops. As entries drop and exit from the industry increases and peaks, lagging the peak of
entry rates usually couple of years.
This classical behavior of firm entry-exit dynamics is observed as the result of our simulation. The entry
rate into the digital camera market sharply increased during 1990s and reached its peak at 1998. The
trend in exit rates peaked in 2000 and started to decline after. If we examine the actual number of
companies for digital camera, there was sharp increase during 1990s, hitting its peak at 54 in 1999, and
then started declining continuously, were it reached levels of a few remaining in market at 2020 (Figure
22).
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Figure 22 Dynamics of entry-exit of firms into digital camera market24
Price/cost is another leading indicator of competition dynamics. In the early phase of a new technology
both cost and price are at its peak. There are not enough economies of scale yet to reduce the costs and
for firms with their unique technologies protected by IP rights and a mostly vertically integrated
structure, profit margins tend to be high. As dominant design or standards emerge and production
volume increases, costs start to decline. Industry structure converts to horizontal and the market
matures. The product or service becomes "commoditized", where product differentiation is difficult,
customer loyalty and brand values are low, and profit margins gets very thin. The only sustainable
advantage comes from cost leadership. Commoditization is more aggravated by excess capacity.
Margins are highly sensitive to capacity utilization and product innovation slows or stops, although
process innovation continues in pursuit of a better cost advantage.
24 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
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Figure 23 shows the price dynamics for both film and digital cameras. Early digital camera prices were
far more than average film camera prices. The market was small, costs were higher, and fluid
technologies possessed by entrants were protected by IP laws. As the market grew and was flooded
with incumbents and start-ups, competition intensified, economies of scale increased, thus continuously
decreasing the average costs and price. As unit costs declines, quality improves as a function of
cumulative production. This is also known as the "learning curve" effect. After the emergence of a
dominant design triggers industry consolidation, only a few leading suppliers can remain in market. As a
mass market forms, they now have the advantage of realizing substantial economies of scale contingent
on high levels of capacity utilization. In 2004 the average cost of digital cameras equaled film cameras
and continued to decline thereafter, whereas the price of film cameras was hanging around their
commodity pricing levels.
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Figure 23 Dynamics of price for film and digital cameras25
As competition intensifies in an emerging market, we see drastic improvement in key performance
metrics of the products. Increasing performance and stabilization of technology accelerates
development of mass market, bolstering attractiveness by consumers and users.
25 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
There are a few key performance metrics for digital cameras. Resolution is the key parameter that
affects the image quality directly. Optical zoom is another important metric for taking quality pictures.
Others that can be cited are battery life, size, weight, and ease of photo transfer to other digital media.
Here we only simulate the key metric, resolution which is measured in Megapixels. Until 2000, average
resolution was less than 1.5 Megapixels. It started to increase sharply after this year maturing at 6
Megapixels at 2020. A significant portion of the performance gain takes place between 2002 and 2010
(Figure 24).
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Figure 24 Dynamics of product performance for digital cameras26
The perceived risks of an emerging technology are high in its early stage. New technology is unproven,
low in key performance metrics compared to the old technology, and potential users have reasons to be
skeptical and cautious. Many users who are conscious about technological uncertainties and price wars
prefer to wait and see products get more mature and prices drop to reasonable levels. As a market
transitions from an emerging market to a mass market, quantity and quality of information about the
new technology improves, allowing more confident assessments and decisions by users and buyers. In
business markets, highly respected "reference users" legitimize the new technology and enable its
selection to be defendable. Then the risk of not adopting it can be seen as "behind the times", or simply
26 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
"not getting it". In consumer markets, products or services based on the new technology can become
fashionable and a "must have". Fear of being outdated or lagging in time will start affecting risk adverse
consumers and even conservative buyers.
In the simulation output of user willingness to switch to digital cameras, two spikes can be observed. At
first, as growth of an installed base ramped up, adoption of early digital cameras accelerated. This was
the first reaction to the new technology taking place around 1997 and buyers were mostly early
adopters. These users were either amateur or professional photographers (prosumers) who were
enthusiastic about the new technology and wanted to start experimenting with it as early as possible.
The second spike happened when the price-performance of digital cameras increased significantly. This
is the significant indicator of the developing mass market. Around 2005 mass market found a solid
ground and the early majority, average consumers in U.S. population, started opting towards digital
cameras, instead of buying a new film camera. Finally late majority and laggards adopted the
technology, user requirements continued to rise and expectations for key performance metrics became
even higher compared to old technology. By 2020 adoption of the technology will be completed and film
cameras could only stay in markets for a few niche segments (Figure 25).
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Figure 25 Dynamics of user willingness to switch digital cameras27
When a new technology invades a market, it improves its performance in the form of "S-shaped"
growth. Decline of the old technology usually depicts a reversed "S-shaped". Most comparable
simulations of system dynamics to Lotka-Volterra modeling is unit sales of technologies, which depicts
the behavior described. As it can be seen from figure 26, unit sales of the digital camera market
continuously increased since 1990 and unit sale of film cameras declined. In 2005 actual sales of digital
cameras exceeded those of film cameras. The firms which have a large portion of the market and
investments of R&D and production of the old technology usually do not sit back and wait for the new
technology to invade the market. They respond with bursts of performance improvements and new
functionality to their products in order to keep the declining sales up, along with major marketing
campaigns and promotions. The battle here between old and new technology is reflected as waves of
units sales in the displayed simulation. It usually continues until unit sales of the new technology exceed
those of the old technology, and clearly continues to rise. After this point of no return, established
players of the old technology either exit the market rapidly, or develop/acquire competencies with the
new technology. The technology battle is completed; there after sales of the new technology improve
confidently and the decline of the old technology accelerates.
27 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
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Figure 26 Dynamics of film and digital camera unit salesa
Transition of a mass market from an old technology to a new technology takes decades of. In 1991
Kodak released the first digital camera aimed at photojournalists with 1.3 Megapixel sensors. Since then
new models and features flooded the market with drastic performance improvements. By many industry
experts the conversion of the mass market to digital is accepted as finished in 1998. Even though there
are many film camera models on sale today, and many old models still in use, all major cameras makers
have stopped their R&D efforts on film cameras. Figure 27 depicts number of units in use for both
analog and digital cameras. From the time the first digital cameras appeared on the market in 1990 to
the eventual total number of slightly less than 150 M in 2020, took about 20 yrs. During this time the
total number of film cameras in the market continuously dropped, and this drop accelerated after
number of digital cameras grabs the majority of market share from film cameras in 2009.
28 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
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Figure 27 Dynamics of units in use for film and digital cameras29
29 Weil, H.B., Utterback, J.M., "The dynamics of Innovative Industries", The Twenty-third International Conference of the System Dynamics
Society, Boston, MA, July 17-21, 2005
Simulation by Lotka and Volterra model
Numeric solution of Lotka and Volterra
Lotka-Volterra equations or predator-prey equations, express the dynamics of multi-mode framework,
proposed by Pistorius and Utterback, very well mathematically. The major drawback of this formulation
is their coupled differential equation nature, which inhibits an explicit solution. However they can be
solved numerically, Pielou has shown that equations can be solved in a numerical form for the case of
pure competition [Pisterious and Utterback 1995, 1997]. Pielou's extended solution in Eq"4 of chapter
3, considers J number of technologies interacting in the same market niche, incorporating symbiosis,
predator-prey scenarios as well as pure competition.
The numeric form solution for Ti(t) can be found by extending Pielou's solution to the general case.
Eqn 5
eaiTi(t)
Ti(t + 1) = t 30
1 =1 sijcij(e ai -1)
i=1 ai Tj(t)
This formulation is a general solution for multi-technology, multi-mode interaction. Researchers can use
this model for interaction in a number of technologies where interaction among any pair can be pure
competition, symbiosis or predator-prey. One of the advantages of this solution is its ease of
implementation of it on a spread sheet. Using simple algorithm tools such as linear optimization and
curve fitting, dynamics of competition between two technologies can be simulated and the future can
be predicted.
Simulating here the pure competition between film and digital camera technologies, we have two
technologies, making J =2. For two technologies that are in pure competition mode, unit sales of each
technology will result in the following equation for technology i =1 (digital camera):
Eqn 6
T1 (t + 1) = eaTt)Ss1 1 Cc 1 (e a - 1) T 12 C12 (eal - 1) 2 12 a
-al - al T2 )
30 Pistorius, C.W.I., Utterback, J.M., "A Lotka-Volterra Model for Multi-mode technological interaction: Modeling Competition, Symbiosis and
Predator Prey Modes", Proceedings of the Fifth international Conference on Management of technology, Miami, FL, Feb 27 - March 1, 1996
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And for technology i =2 (film camera):
ea2T 2(t) Eqn7
T2(t + 1) S21C2 (ea - 1) Tt) S2 2 C2 2 (ea2 - 1) T(t)
a2  a2
Use of spread sheet for simulating Lotka- Volterra equations
We have the actual data of film and camera unit sales from 1994 to 2004. What we need to find is the
optimal values of al, a2 and cll, c12, c21, c22, to fit the best curve in data we have at hand. We
generate an error function for the difference between the actual and prediction data, and run the
ExcelTM solver add-on for minimization of this error function. The steps of the approach for simulating
the predicted technology dynamics using Microsoft's spread sheet program, ExcelTM , are as follows:
1. First, we simply formulate equation 7 and 8 to Excel for columns named "Film Prediction" and "Digital
Prediction". These two columns will contain the data which will be simulated, in Figure 28. The variables
in equations are given on top of the sheet. Note the gray cells for al, a2, and cll, c12, c21, and c22.
These cells are going to be used by ExcelTM solver for the values that need to be optimized for
minimizing the error function for the best possible curve fit. It is best to assign initial conditions to "1".
Also note that sli, s12, s21, and s22 are all given "-1", as this value represents the pure competition
mode of two technologies. Second we assign two more columns for actual film and actual digital camera
sales and enter the market data at hand. At this stage we also put maximum limits for film and digital
cameras predictions into a green row, in order to bound the upper limit of the market.
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Figure 28 Formulation of Lotka- Volterra equations in excel sheet
2. In order to employ a curve fitting to the actual data by the equations we use, we need to define an
error function. For each year, the following error function can be used for the best possible fit:
Eqn 8
Error(t) = IT (t)prediction - Ti(t)actual2 + I(t)prediction - T(actual 12
Next we enter error function above as a separate column, and also allocate weight column to improve
the fit for any time point. Then we sum all errors at the bottom to one cell as Total Error. The total Error
cell will be used as the target cell by the solver for the objective of minimization (Figure 29).
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Figure 29 Formulation of error function for curve fitting
3. Then we run the Excel TM solver add-on for performing a linear optimization to find the best values for
al, a2, and c11l, c12, c21, c22 variables. We define these as changing cells and we define the Total Error
cell as the target cell. Further, as constraints we define that any predicted value cannot be larger than
the values we provided in the green row. By this constraint we can put an upper limit to market size
(Figure 30).
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Figure 30 Use of solver add-on for optimizing equation parameters
4. When the solver is able to converge and find the least possible Total Error, we have the best fit values
for film prediction and actual prediction and all the parameters for equations are optimized (Figure 31).
The model parameters which ExcelTM solver evaluated for best prediction curve of digital and film
camera case, given the supplied market data, are given below:
al = -0.274739451699818
a2 = 1.20367196656898
cll = -2.14E-08
c12 = 3.48E-08
c21 = 2.36E-08
c22 = 3.95E-08
Haritg
laritg
fit data
Figure 31 Optimized parameters as solver converges to a solution
5. In order to complete the unit sale numbers, we need to simply extend the equations through the
years, we do not have actual values and generate predictions for these years. Since we have optimized
the parameters for best curve fit in the simulation of Lotka-Volterra, all we need to do is select and
extend the last year calculated through the years we want to predict (Figure 32).
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Figure 32 Predicted values for film and digital sales based on solver's optimization
6. Last, we can select film prediction and digital prediction columns and generate a line graph,
presenting the dynamics of battle between film and digital cameras between 1994 and 2020 (Figure 33).
According to the estimation of the model by year 2010, digital camera unit sales is slightly above 30
million units and film camera unit sales drop to 48,000 units. As digital camera sales remain pretty much
flat until year 2020, film cameras continue to drop and cannot sustain any market presence.
~__rlll~-··-~--·111111. ,. ..... .. . ... .... .. ...
1 254.889
1 187,123
1 995.540
1 3,075.742
1 324,273
1 28.660
1 1.752,575
1 63
otal Error 8,618,86
The solver minimi-ee thio
error function by
changing cii, end oij
above
dO,UUU,UUU -
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000 -
15,000,000 -
10,000,000 -
5,000,000 -
0-
0 D c 0 CN d CD COO cI J D cO) 0) O00000) 0 ' 0- -) 0)0000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0V(V (
Figure 33 Simulation graph representing technology battle between film and digital cameras
~C AAA ~~A
-----------------------------
6. Discussion of results
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results from the simulation of digital and analog camera
markets using Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics models. While we are making a comparison along
each key innovation attributes, we will also incorporate market reviews and analyst reports for digital
and camera markets, as appropriate. Table 2 is a summarized comparison of Lotka-Volterra model and
System Dynamics approach in modeling innovation dynamics, as well as key numerical facts of the
simulation results for digital and film camera markets. Further in this chapter, comparisons of the both
techniques are made using several key metrics of innovation dynamics with reflections on the status of
digital and film camera markets by 2008.
Table 2Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics compared
Lotka-Volterra equations, also
known as the predator-prey
equations, are a pair of first
order, non-linear, differential
equations frequently used to
describe the dynamics of
biological systems in which two
species interact, one a predator
and one its prey.
It was proposed in 1925 by the
American biophysicist Alfred
Lotka and the Italian
mathematician Vito Volterra.
Cycling mode between two
species
i.e: baboons and cheetahs
System dynamics is an approach
to understanding the behavior of
complex systems over time.
System dynamics uses feedback
loops and stocks and flows for
simulating the behavior of
complex systems. It deals with
internal feedback loops and time
delays that affect the behavior of
an entire system which can both
include technical and social
components. It was founded by
Jay Forrester at MIT in late 1950s.
Fundamental modes:
1. Exponential growth
2. Goal seeking
3. S-Shaped growth
4. Oscillation
5. Growth with oscillation
6. Overshoot and collapse
SD model can generate
any output which would
cause by superposition of
fundamental modes
depending on models
complexity and
configuration
Lotka and Volterra
Model core
Fundamental
behavior
r
System Dynamics
Solution
approaches
Modeling a complex system using
System Dynamics approach
requires use of sophisticated
simulation software, which all
components of the system can be
modeled as stocks or flows, and
their interactions can be modeled
as loops, in a system. Commercial
software is available for this
purpose, such as Vensim.
Comparisons of simulation results in LV and SD models
2003 2003
30 M in 2008 33 M in 2018
Below 1 Million by 2007 Below 3 Million by 2020
Landscape of consumer imaging market in 2008
When digital cameras first appeared on the market more than a decade ago, they were perceived as
more novel than practical for both professional and amateur photographers. Prices were well above
$1,000, image resolution and quality was poor, and the cameras were bulky and inconvenient to use.
While they did offer convenience, immediacy of images, and the ability to integrate easily with PCs and
the growing online phenomenon, they were mostly ignored by consumers and only the highest quality
and most expensive with prices well above $50,000 were embraced by professionals. As the key
performance metrics of digital cameras improved very rapidly, the fast adoption of digital cameras took
place by consumers in the last five years, portraying an explosive growth.
According to a recent research by industry experts, the installed base has more than doubled in that
time period with 65% of consumers purchasing digital cameras, up from 32% in 2002. At the same time,
consumers showed a marked decline in ownership of 35mm film cameras, with ownership dropping
from 69% in 2002 to only 48% in 2007 (Figure 34). Additionally, it is likely that even consumers who still
63
Crossover year
Max number of
Digital cameras
Min number of
Film cameras
Lotka-Volterra equations cannot
be solved explicitly. Most
considerable numerical
solutions are as follows:
Pielou solved equations for pure
competition case (1969).
Pistorius and Utterback
proposed a numerical solution
for multi-technology and multi
mode interaction(pure
competition, predator-prey or
symbiosis) (1996).
own 35mm film cameras are using them less. It can be concluded form this data that the mass market
transition from film to digital was over by the year 2007 [Gartenberg 2007].
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Figure 34 Consumer transition to digital is over31
Digital technology offers many advantages to analog in the world of imaging. In addition to the
immediacy of capturing and reviewing images, consumers now have the ability to share pictures
electronically (via both e-mail and online hosted storage), manipulate, crop, and edit photos. This digital
behavior is now mature. In the past, consumers exhibited what is called analog behavior in their digital
worlds and rarely took advantage of the capabilities that the shift to digital technologies offered them
For example it is far more enjoyable to view high-resolution pictures on a high-definition display than it
is to view 4x6 print; yet, despite the proliferation of high-resolution screens on both PCs and TVs,
31 Gartenberg, M., "Digital imaging, uncovering new revenue opportunities in a mature market", Personal Technology, Jupiter Research, Vol 3,p. 2, 2007
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consumers still viewed printing as their best way to view and share photos. Most users in the past
exchanged pictures with a memory card, printed photos either at home or professionally, and shared
them the way they used to do in old film days, ignoring many of the advantages, digital had brought.
Today, users are far more engaged in the digital advantage, especially when it comes to sharing their
photos. 49% of consumers e-mail pictures and 29% of consumers upload them to the Internet (Figure
35). In addition, consumers across the board are manipulating their images in sophisticated ways and
engage in activities including resizing, removing red-eye, and cropping photos. The increasing popularity
of photo sharing sites (i.e. www.flickr.com, and www.ofoto.com), or socialization sites (i.e.
www.myspace.com, www.facebook.com), where you can share photos in the context of events and
blogs, supports this transition in use context of photography [Gartenberg and Wood 2006].
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Figure 35 Major post-capture activities of users32
Performance characteristics of new technology which drives competition
Performance characteristics of products and their relationship with technology progression and effects
on R&D are modeled with System Dynamics. Readers can review the details of part of the model in
Appendix A. The model includes several important variables such as R&D productivity, R&D expenditure,
32 Gartenberg, M., "Digital imaging, uncovering new revenue opportunities in a mature market", Personal Technology, Jupiter Research, Vol 3,
p.3, 2007
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effect of competition on R&D, and effect of profits on R&D. Although multiple performance
characteristics are not incorporated, a general performance level is simulated by "level of technology",
defined as a stock in the model. It is not possible to model interactions of these variables in Lotka-
Volterra model.
In general when consumers are shopping for a camera, there are three categories of features:
compulsory, complementary, and luxury. Compulsory features encompass image and lens quality as well
as resolution; these features are of the utmost importance to consumer in the selection and purchase of
a digital camera. 51% of online consumers said image quality was the most sought-after feature in a new
camera while 28% of consumers said resolution was a priority, according to recent research (Figure 36)
[Gartenberg 2007]. These requirements are easily met in today's digital camera market. Point and shoot
cameras with resolution up to 8 megapixels are available while D-SLRs cameras range up to 21
megapixels. Prices are dropping on both point and shoot cameras and digital D-SLRs, making both
accessible to a wide range of consumers. The complementary features include ease of photo transfer to
another device, availability of optical zoom, storage, and length of battery life. While these features are
not key drivers to purchasing a device, they are important to the capture experience. Without the
facility to transfer easily, consumers cannot share photos. The optical zoom feature improves image
quality, and no capture device can meet consumer expectations without storage capacity. These are all
features that have been available on 35mm cameras for some time, and consumers expect them to be
available on a digital camera. Luxury features are the least sought-after features on a digital camera.
These features enhance the capture and post-capture experience, but do not impact the general quality
of the capture experience. These features include color display and the ability to connect directly to the
internet or a TV. Since these features are newer additions to the digital camera, consumers may take
some time to adjust to or see value in them.
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Limits to growth
Both of the models used, Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics simulation predicted the maximum unit
sales of digital cameras will be in the range of 30 to 40 million units in the year 2020. Lotka-Volterra
model reached 30 million in year 2008, far more rapidly than the System Dynamics model which reached
the same level in 2018. Lotka-Volterra's rapid increase can be attributed to its algorithm's effort to
better fit the sharp ascent of the actual data, provided. In both of these models the upper bound for the
market is an adjustable parameter of the system.
Steady growth of the digital camera market continues past the year 2008. Huge price drops and
quantum leaps in enhancing the ease-of-use and quality of the medium are expected to translate into
major gains for leading manufactures such as Canon, Sony, and Nikon, as they drive to accelerate the
use of digital photographic technology in the mass consumer market.
The point and shoot camera type, providing high ease of use, was the initial entry point into the mass
market for digital camera manufacturers. The limit of this market is bounded by the total house hold
33Gartenberg, M., "Digital imaging, uncovering new revenue opportunities in a mature market", Personal Technology, Jupiter Research, Vol 3,
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numbers in the U.S. market. As the total number of households in U.S. is in the range of 30 million to 40
million, predications of both models is in line with reality. However trends after 2005 and the creation of
two new market segments, engage the maturing digital camera market toward another growth trend.
The structural change and creation of these new segments will be discussed in the next section.
Structural changes in the market
Although initially digital cameras were mostly the "point-and-shoot" type, recently two new segments
were created: Digital-Single Lens Reflex (D-SLR) cameras and camera phones. As these relatively new
segments eat up point-and-shoot cameras, a structural change occurs in the digital photography market.
Both of the models we used in our study do not incorporate any changes in market structure or
segments and assume the analyzed market has only one segment, that is the point and shoot type of
digital cameras and 35mm film cameras.
In 2003 Canon, introduced the Digital Rebel, the first digital SLR under $1000 with a lens. It was a well
timed move, as image quality and resolution was on a continuous rise and many early point and shoot
digital camera buyers were returning to the market for better performance offered with a new
generation of point and shoot cameras. Nikon also announced in 2006 that its success with high-margin
D-SLR cameras helped account for a 26% increase in third-quarter sales, tripling its profits. Canon ended
2005 with sales up 8.3% and a net revenue increase of 11.9%, performance it attributes largely to its D-
SLRs and photo printers. According to Lyra research in Newton, Mass, it is not just the high margins of D-
SLR's drawing manufacturers' interest to this segment. The point and shoot camera market is likely to be
squeezed further by high quality cameras, introduced into mobile phones and hand held devices (Figure
37) and manufacturers will be most likely to expand their product lines for "prosumers" in the high end
D-SLR segment[Austen 2006].
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Figure 37 Pressures on Point and Shoot type cameras"
Hand held devices, particularly phones, are squeezing point-and-shoot type cameras from below as their
image quality and resolution continuously increase. According to recent research, the top three factors
encouraging camera phone use in place of digital camera use are improved resolution, improved zoom,
and improved lenses (Figure 38). Although camera phones are improving at a high pace, many of the
point and shoot cameras are still ahead in these attributes [Gartenberg and Wood 2006].
Easy to get prints 7%
Flash available 11%
Carry only one device 11%
7%Pay for only one device 1
Larger screen 6%
Other 3%
None of the above 2
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
P rcent2ge of Ontlne Users
I2oos E12oos0
Figure 38 Camera phone quality requirements to overtake digital cameras 34
Gartenberg, M., "Digital imaging, uncovering new revenue opportunities in a mature market", Personal Technology, Jupiter Research, Vol 3,
p.8, 2007
While camera phone technology appears to be making unparalleled advances, digital camera quality and
functionality is improving simultaneously. As camera phone capabilities increase (i.e., resolution and
memory), digital camera technology also improves (i.e., resolution and image sensor quality). As a result,
no single device will dominate the digital imaging market in the near term. However when camera
phone attributes reach a level that is optimum for average user, without losing its phone attributes,
such as reception quality, and pocketability, it will have the strongest chance of displacing point and
shoot cameras. In such a scenario, as mobile phones will become individual device, market limit in U.S.
for digital cameras would be automatically bounded by the active population of U.S.
Re-invigoration of old technology
As mentioned in chapter 2, when a new technology rises, the established players with the old
technology do not always sit back and relax. Most of them fight back. The burst of improvement from
the established player in figure 5 of chapter 2 symbolically depicts this behavior. The established player
briefly enjoys this burst of improvement, however eventually the performance of invading product
surpasses the established product, which has the improvement becoming marginal over time. In Lotka-
Volterra modeling this behavior cannot be modeled. However in the System Dynamics model,
technology re-invigoration is a variable which affects product performance of the old technology.
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In figure 39, the re-invigoration effect for a generic run of the System Dynamic model is depicted.
Performance of the new technology initially is well below the old products and improves significantly
during 2009-15. The performance gap between the two generations of technology narrows. Indeed,
performance of the new products in 2012 exceeds the performance of the old technology in 2008. But
the old technology has been re-invigorated. As they feel more and more pressure from the new
generation the incumbents find ways to substantially refresh the old technology, boosting its
performance to much higher level. Thus the technology trajectory is not a simple "S-curve" but more
like a "double-S" [Weil and Utterback 2005].
However, when we research actual market conditions, this effect is not seen as clearly in transition from
film cameras to digital camera technology. There are two core competencies for digital cameras that a
company needs to possess in order to become a key player; optics technology and electronics. Sony,
while being the first in digital camera on the market with Mavica, rose to the No.3 spot in digital camera
sales in U.S. with 15.8% of the market, just behind Canon at 17%, and Kodak 16.9%, according to a
recent analysis of a research firm in Sterling, Va. Sony a long time manufacturer, also had good success
in the video camera business, it had already developed a know-how of design and manufacture charged-
coupled devices (CCDs). Leveraging its core competency in electronics manufacturing, its experience in
video camera business, and buying Konica-Minolta's optics technology, Sony abandoned all its film
photo business, and reached the No.3 position in U.S. market. Other major manufacturers who had in-
depth optics technology, such as Canon, Nikon, and Kodak, after stopping all their development efforts
on film cameras one after another, utilized electronics and image processing technology from other
electronics suppliers such as Sony and absorbed this essential core competency over time.
While neither Pentax nor Olympus has followed Konica Minolta's lead and abandoned their consumer
photography business, both have allied themselves with electronics companies. Pentax started
producing Samsung branded D-SLRs, and supplying the Korean maker with its lenses. Olympus and
Panasonic's parent company, Matsushita electric, have similarly joined forces and have yet to unveil its
new products. As seen in this picture of markets, incumbent manufacturers of film cameras who
grasped the inevitable transition to digital fairly quickly were not persistent on further improvement of
film technology. They either exited the market for higher profit businesses such as medical imaging or
accomplished a relatively smooth transition to digital technology without giving away their leading
position to new comers by leveraging competency in electronics from other business units or through
strategic alliances [Austen 2006, Scoblete 2004].
Niche market for old technology
Both models do not have a parameter to define a lower limit for old technology. Lotka-Volterra model
reduces the unit number of old technology to below 1 million in the year 2007 very rapidly in
comparison to the System Dynamics model which is still above 10 million at the same year.
In the early years of digital cameras there were few attributes where they were behind film cameras,
which disturb professional or amateur photographers who take their camera seriously. In the following
attributes, even though improved drastically since the first digital camera on market, the digital camera
is still behind, if they are priced under $1000:
Shutter Lag: For shooting that requires split second timing, shutter lag is critical and digital cameras
especially point-and shoot types are still fall behind film cameras.
Image quality: A glass plate from 1880 still has more resolution than a Canon 1Ds-Mklll, which is known
to be the highest resolution camera in 2007 with 21.1 Megapixels. Film always wins here when used by a
skilled photographer.
Color: Film records and reproduces a broader range of color. This is important for wild landscapes, deep
red cars and flowers.
Dynamic range: Film has a huge advantage in recording highlights. It is usually taken for granted that
spectacular highlights and bright sunsets look the way they do in painting and on film. Digital has a big
problem with this attribute.
Noise: Almost all digital cameras have noise depending on quality of their CCDs and image processing
capability. At higher ISO settings it became more apparent. Although expensive D-SLRs do a better job
with noise, they cannot achieve the results of an analog machine.
Obsolescence: The technology stage of digital cameras is still fluid. Improvements in critical performance
aspects such as resolution, and image quality still increases. New features making photography easier
for average user such as, face or landscape detection, image stabilization, LCD live view etc. are added
with upgrades to new models.
Batteries: Dependency on the battery was a big issue, though capacity of batteries has improved a lot
since early digital cameras. Professionals still carry around extras for outdoor jobs.
As stated above, critical attributes of cameras are continuously improving while the average price
reduces due to intensity in competition in market. Professional photography, which demands highest
image quality, color sensitivity and responsiveness, is still in favor of film cameras. Outdoor, wildlife, and
sports photography, being the leading examples of professional photography are most likely to stay as
niches for film cameras for a long period of time.
Network effects boosting adoption of new technology
As consumers learn to think digitally about their photographic activity and are more inclined towards
sharing their digital photos over internet, network effects for digital imaging increases. As it can be seen
in figure 40 the number of users sharing their photos through a commercial site is 14% in 2007, more
than the 11% of 2006. Fast and low cost sharing of photos through internet definitely boosted the sales
of digital cameras as more people encouraged by the easy and effective use of new technology, creating
a "Lemming effect". Network effects accelerating the adoption of a new technology is represented by a
reinforcing loop in System Dynamics model where as it cannot be captured in Lotka-Volterra model.
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7. Conclusion
In this thesis, we examined and compared two predominant approaches to modeling dynamics of
innovation, the Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics model. We first examined in detail the
characteristics, and building blocks of each approach, and further applied both of them to a recent case
of innovation dynamics. In this case study, we analyzed and simulated competition between film and
digital cameras, with the hope of understanding how competition between these two technologies
unfolded over the last decade and how it may evolve in the near future.
Outputs of both models and current trends and insights from market research reports helped us to
conclude that the technological battle between digital and film cameras was over by 2007. Digital
cameras initially inferior in many essential performance metrics of photography and quite expensive to
buy for an average consumer, exhibited quantum leaps in performance and cost over the period of a
decade, and convinced both consumers and manufacturers that it will be the photography technology of
the future.
In our study we not only analyzed the technological innovation in the camera market but compared and
developed insights on the capabilities of both models. In this respect, we can now drive conclusions for
both models valuable for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches that could
help for further research. First, we can summarize strengths and weaknesses of Multi-mode framework
utilizing Lotka-Volterra solution model as follows:
Strengths:
* Multi-mode framework captures the fact that interaction between technologies is not always
confrontational. It identifies three possible modes of interaction; pure competition where both
technologies inhibit the other's growth rate, symbiosis where both technologies enhance the
other's growth rate, and predator-prey interaction where one technology enhances the other's
growth rate, but the second inhibits the growth rate of the first.
* Multi-mode framework accounts for the transitional effects as the interaction between the
technologies transgresses from one mode to another with time. The notion that the modes of
interaction between two technologies can shift with time is one of the main differentiators of
this framework.
Weaknesses:
* Lotka-Volterra equations, express the dynamics of multi-mode framework, proposed by
Pistorius and Utterback, very well mathematically. The major drawback of this formulation is
their coupled differential equation nature, which inhibits an explicit solution. However they can
be solved numerically, Pielou has shown that equations can be solved in numerical form for the
case of pure competition. Pielou's extended solution can be applied to a spread sheet and by
use of partial real data as an input, optimal curve fitting can be performed to find best
parameters of the model in order to predict the dynamics of future competition.
* Multi-mode framework provides only one dimension over time for the competition of
technologies. The growth rate of the most important competition dimension is often expressed
as unit sale. Bounded with the core differential model of Lotka-Volterra, this model does not
provide any possibility for further analysis of other competition dimensions.
Next, we can summarize strengths and weaknesses of System Dynamics in modeling technological
innovation as follows:
Strengths:
* System Dynamics enables a holistic approach for modeling dynamics of innovation. Building on
fundamentals of casual loop diagrams, stocks, and flows, it is extremely flexible in modelling any
system involving technical, social, or business components with any degree of complexity. The
modularity that it provides is unbounded.
* Leveraging its flexibility, it is possible to model many aspects of dynamics of innovation. In this
study, the competition between digital and film cameras, we simulated, dynamics of entry-exit
of firms, price, product performance, willingness to switch to digital cameras, unit sales, and
units in use.
* System dynamics approach is also very evolvable. Once a base model is established, new
research and ideas can be built upon it in order to analyze and understand dynamics of new
extensions or modifications to the existing system.
Weaknesses:
System Dynamics flexibility and extensibility comes with a price, its complexity. Modeling a
complicated system with this model takes a considerable amount of time, not less than weeks
for an average system. This time frame even accounts for the use of professional modeling
software (such as Vensim), which will incur licensing, other development or maintenance
related costs.
Future work
For future work of this study, there are two main avenues. First one is more research on case studies in
technology centric industries that will verify and improve the capabilities of the System Dynamics
approach. Emerging "new" technologies, in competition with the "old" one, such as Radio Frequency
Identification vs. Bar-Code, or internet based ERP service providers vs. in premise based ERP systems,
are great new case studies that can add value to the research area, by giving more insights on dynamics
of technological innovation.
The second avenue is extending the System Dynamics model for incorporating emerging forms of
innovation. The current model captures many characteristics of innovation dynamics in the context of
competition. Since early 1990s, another emerging form of innovation between firms is through
collaboration, instead of competition. This new innovation and production model, coined as Virtual
Enterprises, by Goldman, in his book, Agile Competitors and Virtual Organizations, describes how small
and medium size enterprises collaborate actively to achieve a high degree of customization, and agility.
Many scholars and authors cite Virtual Enterprises (VEs) as a key enabler of Agility (Goldman et al. 1995,
Gunesekeran 2001). By definition, VE is a temporary consortium formed by real autonomous companies
on the basis of strong collaboration to respond to temporary demands, which a single company with
limited core competencies and production capacity is unable to. Among other enablers of agility such as
concurrent engineering, e-commerce, integrated product/production information systems, VE is of
special interest because it places a greatest demand on a company to co-operate in achieving
collaborative innovation and production Indeed, a VE can accomplish tasks that could be not done by
each of the competitors working sequentially or in tandem.
A future extension of the current System Dynamics model to capture collaborative dynamics of
innovation will be a significant contribution to the field.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains detail models of System Dynamics. These models, created by Weil and Utterback,
were implemented in Vensim software for simulating generically dynamics of competition between
"old" and "new" technology.
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Appendix B
Table 3 Actual data used as input to Lotka-Volterra and System Dynamics models4°
Year Film Actual Digital Actual
1994 15,500,000 0
1995 15,000,000 0
1996 15,100,000 350,000
1997 15,600,000 890,000
1998 16,400,000 1,100,000
1999 17,800,000 1,600,000
2000 19,700,000 2,000,000
2001 16,300,000 6,500,000
Table 4 Prediction output by Lotka-Volterra model
Year Film Prediction Digital Prediction
1994 15,500,000 0
1995 15,000,000 0
1996 15,100,000 350,000
1997 15,743,342 679,236
1998 16,459,033 1,277,567
1999 17,093,162 2,301,056
2000 17,295,083 3,917,437
2001 16,500,986 6,245,525
2002 14,213,775 9,325,133
2003 10,603,269 13,152,143
2004 6,700,046 17,600,043
2005 3,608,588 22,117,122
2006 1,707,282 25,808,329
2007 739,640 28,188,290
2008 304,705 29,458,203
2009 122,423 30,057,663
2010 48,629 30,321,233
2011 19,222 30,432,573
2012 7,583 30,478,529
2013 2,989 30,497,232
2014 1,178 30,504,774
2015 464 30,507,797
2016 183 30,509,002
2017 72 30,509,482
2018 28 30,509,672
2019 11 30,509,748
2020 4 30,509,778
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